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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite its negative connotation,' "forum shopping" in many
cases is simply another strategy used by parties to gain an
advantage in litigation. Since parties to a cause of action may
reside in different cities or the injury may occur in more than one
1. One recent note lists three reasons for the negative connotation associated with forum
shopping: (1) Unseemliness of forum shopping; (2) system costs ("[P]laintiffs may deliberately bring
actions in circuits that have not ruled on the relevant issues in order to avoid certain defeat in a
circuit that ruled unfavorably," thus demanding unnecessary and costly decision-making); and (3)
inability of actors to conform their behavior to legal norms.- Note, Using Choice of Law Rudes to
Make Intercircuii Conflicts Tolerable, 59 N.Y.U. L REV. 1078, 1083 (1984). See COMMISSION ON
REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 220 (1975) (quoting Commission
Consultants Garmbrell and Dunner who stated that forum-shopping "demeans the entire .. .
process"). See also Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TuL L. REv. 553,
553 (1989) (recognizing that "forum-shopping is generally used to reproach who, in [the judge's]
opinion, unfairly exploits jurisdictional or venue rules to affect the outcome of a lawsuit").
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place, a plaintiff may have the opportunity to initiate proceedings
in one of several jurisdictions. Given a choice, the plaintiff will
"shop" for, or select, the forum with the most favorable
substantive and procedural laws. In the United States, procedural
rules may afford the defendant an opportunity to move the case to
a different forum. This opportunity may limit the plaintiff's forum
choices and may provide the defendant with the forum advantage.
Choice of law plays an important role in the parties' forum
decision. Choice of law rules govern which substantive laws the
forum court will apply. A party must carefully consider the choice
of law rules of each jurisdiction in order to determine which
jurisdiction will apply the most favorable laws.
Defamation is an area of law that lends itself to these forum
selection and choice of law issues. Defamation law serves two
countervailing purposes. It protects the right to privacy and it
preserves freedom of speech.2 Each country weighs these policies
differently. A plaintiff who has the opportunity to select a forum
will attempt to initiate proceedings where this balance is most
favorable.
The increase in communication due to advanced technology has
led to more complex defamation litigation.3 For example, the
plaintiffs and defendants may be domiciled in more than one
country or the defamatory broadcast may be received in several
countries. The plaintiff in a defamation action may therefore have
a group of countries from which to choose a forum. When a
plaintiff initiates proceedings in a. country with a comparatively
insignificant interest in the case only to take advantage of that
2. There have been two contrasting value judgments in the law of defamation, one
that free publication is socially valuable, but must be kept within civilized bounds,
the other that protection of a person's reputation is of primary importance, and
invasion of it has to be justified.
8 C.E.D. title 45, part 1, § 3 at 36 & n.4 (Ont. 3rd) (Aug. 1990) (quoting Steele v. Mirror
Newspapers, 2 N.S.W.LR. 348 (N.S.W. CA.) (1974) (per Hutley, J.A.). See Pielemeier,
Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law: The Special Case of Multistate Defamation, 133 U.
PA. L REv. 381, 388 (1985); Lingens v. Austria, 8 E.H.R.R. 407, 418 (1986); Note, Protection of
Reputation versus Freedom of Expression: Striking a Manageable Compromise in the Tort of
Defamation, 63 S. CAl. L. REV. 433 (1990).
3. Cooper, Defamation by Satellite, 132 SOC. J. 1021 (discussing the impact of satellites on
defamation law).
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country's more favorable substantive laws, the plaintiff is
strategizing to the extreme of manipulating. This type of "forum
shopping" may not only adversely affect the defendant; it may also
undermine the policies and laws of the countries which have a
substantially greater interest in the cause of action.
The purpose of this comment is to discuss how application of
the appropriate choice-of-law method will preserve each country's
defamation laws and policies. First, the comment will compare the
defamation laws and policies of the United States, England, and
Canada. The defamation section will focus primarily on the public
figure plaintiff4 Next, the comment will describe the choice of
law rules in these countries. This analysis will show how initiating
an action in one country may, under certain circumstances,
undermine the policies and laws of another country. Finally, the
comment will show that courts may avoid this negative result in a
way that is fair to both parties.
IT. THE DEFAMATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND,
AND CANADA
The defamation laws of the United States, England, and Canada
appear similar because all of them derive from English common
law. Each country, however, has developed different burdens and
standards in defamation law based on that country's unique policy
on privacy and on freedom of the press.
A. The United States
1. Common Law Burdens of Proof
To sustain a defamation action under United States common
law, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant communicated' to a
4. See infra note 17 and accompanying text (explaining the term -public figure").
5. This comment will focus on the communication of libel. Libel, as defined by the Second
Restatement of Torts, is a publication in written or printed words, or by any other communication
which has the potentially harmful qualities of written or printed words. RESTATEMENT (SEcoD) OF
TORTS § 568 (1977).
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third party a false, unprivileged statement of fact8 about the
plaintiff that harmed the plaintiff's reputation." In cases
involving private plaintiffs,1 the plaintiff has the burden of
proving that the statement was unprivileged, communicated to a
third party, about the plaintiff, and harmful to the plaintiff's
reputation." Truth and absolute privileges 3  are complete
6. Id, § 558 (1977). Under common law, the defendant had the burden of proving that the
statement was true. PROSSER AND KErrON ON TORTS 839 (5th ed. 1977) [hereinafter PRossER AND
KELrON].
7. Statements that are absolutely privileged under the common law are those made by federal
officials and high ranking state officers acting within their scope of employment and those made by
individuals involved in trial proceedings, hearings, or legislative proceedings. PRossER AND KErON,
supra note 6, at 816 (citing Ginger v. Bowles, 369 Mich. 680, 120 N.W.2d 842, cert. denied, 375
U.S. 856, reh'g denied, 375 U.S. 982 (1963)); id. at 820 (citing Kilboum v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168
(1880)); id. at 821 (citing Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896) (defamation of the Postmaster
General)). Qualified privileges, which can be rebutted with common law malice, include: Protection
of the defendant's interest (self-defense); fair comment; and protection of a third party because of
legal or moral duty. Id. at 825, 831.
8. RESTATEMNT (SECOND) oFTORTS §§ 565,566 (1977). To determine whether the statement
is fact or opinion, courts examine: The specific language; whether the statement is verified; the
general context of the statement; and the broader context in which the statement appeared. Olman
v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). The first
amendment provides more protection for opinion than for facts. However, this rule has eroded:
[Where a statement of 'opinion' on a matter of public concern reasonably
implies false and defamatory facts regarding public figures or officials,
those individuals must show that such statements were made with
knowledge of false implications or with recdess disregard for the truth.
Similarly, where such a statement involves a private figure on a matter of
public opinion, a plaintiff must show that the false connections were made
with some level of fault as required by Gertz .... We are not persuaded
that in addition to these protections an additional separate constitutional
provision for 'opinion' is required to ensure the freedom of expression
guaranteed by the First Amendment.
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, 496 U.S.._, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2706-07 (1990).
9. The general test to determine if a statement is about the plaintiff is whether a reasonable
person would understand that communication to be about the plaintiff. REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 564 (1977).
10. Id § 559 (defining "defamatory" as "tend[ing] to harm the reputation of another as to
lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing
with him").
11. See id) § 580A, comment c (describing evolution of the public figure/private figure
distinction).
12. See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (describing the standard under the Gertz
rule).
13. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing the absolute privileges).
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defenses to common law defamation.' Should the defendant
argue the presence of a qualified privilege," the plaintiff can rebut
the defense by proving that the defendant acted with express
malice. 6
2. New York Times v. Sullivan and Defamation Protected
under the First Amendment
When a party allegedly defames a public figure 7 on a matter
of public concern,' the public figure plaintiff must prove actual
malice as an additional element of the cause of action. 9 The
plaintiff can prove actual malice by showing that the defendant
acted with reckless disregard for the truth of the statement or that
the defendant knew the statement was false."° New York Times v.
Sullivan2y ' is the seminal United States defamation case involving
a public figure plaintiff.
(a) New York Times: The Case
The New York Times newspaper published an advertisement
which criticized Sullivan, Commissioner of Public Affairs of
Montgomery, Alabama, for the mistreatment of black students
protesting segregation.' Several of the allegations were false.'
The New York Times received the advertisement from a reputable
14. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 581A, 584 (1977).
15. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing the qualified privileges).
16. PROSSER AND KEmON, supra note 6, at 833-34 (defining malice).
17. See Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WM. & MY. L. REv. 905 (1983); Ashdown, Of Public
Figures and Public Interest-The Libel Law Conundrum, 25 WM. & My. L. REv. 937 (1983);
Daniels, Public Figure Revisited, 25 WM. & MY. L. REv. 957 (1983) (explaining the term "public
figure"). See also Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) (describing "public figures" as those
who "usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence
have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements .... ").
18. See generally Ashdown, supra note 17 (discussing the meaning of "public interest").
19. See New York Ti1mes v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
20. Id at 287-88.
21. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
22. Id at 256-57.
23. Id at 258.
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advertising agency; the newspaper, however, did not verify the
facts before publication.' The Alabama Supreme Court held that
a defamation suit between private citizens did not require
constitutional scrutiny because the fourteenth amendment protects
state actions only.' The United States Supreme Court reversed.26
The United States Supreme Court interpreted the first
amendment, as applied through the fourteenth amendment, to
protect speech in private defamation actions.27 The Court held that
a public official could not recover damages for defamatory
statements without establishing actual malice with "convincing
clarity."' The Court defined "malice" as "knowledge of falsity
or reckless disregard for the truth." ' Placing the heavy burden on
public officials in defamation actions, the Court reasoned, would
ensure the "opportunity for free political discussion to the end that
government may be responsive to the will of the people ..... ,30
The Supreme Court decided that since the defendants reasonably
relied on a reputable advertising firm for the contents of the
advertisement, the plaintiffs could not establish actual malice. The
plaintiffs therefore had failed to establish a prima facie case."1
24. Id at 260-61.
25. Id at 264.
26. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 264.
27. Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts have
applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim impose[s] invalid restrictions on
their constitutional freedoms of speech and press. It matters not that law has been
applied in a civil action and that it is common law only... The test is not the
form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such
power has in fact been exercised....
Id. at 265.
In his article, Epstein explains the Supreme Court's reasoning, -It]he states cannot, either
through their courts or their legislature, circumvent the constitutional prohibitions by deft
manipulations of common law rules." Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong? 53 U. CH.
L REV. 782, 783 (1986) [hereinafter Epstein]. E. BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 181-84 (1987)
(discussing New York Times and its effects) [hereinafter BARENDT]. See also Denbeaux, The First
Word of the First Amendment, 80 Nw. U.L RLrv. 1156 (1986).
28. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285-86.
29. Id. at 279-80.
30. I at 269 (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
31. Id. at 285-86.
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(b) The Effects of New York Times
While some legal scholars have praised the New York Times
holding,' others have doubted its precedential value and its
fairness.' Nonetheless, New York Times has paved the way for a
plethora of cases riddled with confusion and complexity.
In Curtis Publishing v. Butts,' the Supreme Court extended the
application of New York Times to public figures. The Supreme
Court reasoned that public figures command "sufficient continuing
public interest and ha[ve] sufficient access to the means of
counterargument to be able 'to expose through discussion the
falsehoods and fallacies' of the defamatory statements."'3 Courts
have also narrowed the application of New York Times rule. In
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,' the Supreme Court distinguished a
defamation action brought by a public figure from a defamation
action brought by a private figure. The latter merely required proof
of negligence to sustain the cause of action."
Courts have adopted various procedural methods in applying the
New York Times rule in order to make it more understandable for
32. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on the "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment," 1964 Sup. Cr. REv. 191,221 & n.125 (stating that the New York Times case "is [an]
occasion for dancing in the streets").
33. "Mhe rule offends the sense of justice because it makes innocent persons bear the
harms that have been inflicted upon them by other persons, including those who
have acted with negligence or gross negligence."
Epstein, supra note 27, at 801.
There *hould have been a flurry of cases to clarify loose ends in the year
immediately following the decision, followed by a period of stable
tranquility. The trend has been just the reverse, for without question the
law of defamation is far more controversial today than it was a decade
ago.
Id at 783. Adler, Annals of Law: Two Trials, NEW YORKER, June 23, 1986, at 35 (stating that
although New York Times works in the context of New York Times, it is unworkable in other contexts
because it is "not very carefully or cogently reasoned.... Above all, it did not foresee that, in
modem life, it is the press that has, to a degree become unitary, powerful, monolithic, suppressing
the very diversity that it was the purpose of the First Amendment to protect....
34. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
35. Id at 155 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
36. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
37. Id at 347 (holding that, in cases involving private figure plaintiffs, the states could impose
their own standard of liability provided they did not impose strict liability).
620
1990 /Defamation Via Modern Communication
the jury. Some courts have trifurcated the verdict. In Sharon v.
Time Magazine,' for example, the former Israeli Defense Minister
General Ariel Sharon brought suit against Time Magazine for an
article implicating Sharon in the 1982 massacre of Palestinians in
Lebanese refugee camps. 9 The New York district court instructed
the jury to decide three issues, whether: 1) Time's statement that
Sharon intended to raid the camps was defamatory;' 2) Time's
statements were true; and 3) Time acted either with knowledge
of falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth.'2 By splitting
the verdict into three separate issues, the court avoided the
confusion that inevitably arises from applying different standards
of proof and vague definitions of law to a single verdict.
(c) The Problems with New York Times
Despite the substantive and procedural developments of New
York Times, many commentators have criticized the holding for the
problems created in its application. In response to the lower
courts' difficulty in determining when to apply the Constitution in
defamation cases, the Supreme Court has drawn the line at "public
figures." Deciding who qualifies as a "public figure," however,
has plagued the courts."3  The decision of when to apply
constitutional scrutiny is only one of many obstacles the court must
overcome. Once the court has determined that the New York Times
rule applies, the court must then grapple with the ambiguous
language of the case.
One of the problems a court faces in applying the New York
Times holding is explaining the meaning of the term "actual
malice" to the jury. The jury tends to misunderstand the meaning
38. 575 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); 609 F. Supp. 1291
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); 103 F.R.D. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); 17 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 80 (1985).
39. Sharon, 599 F. Supp. 538, 564-80 (describing events surrounding the action). See R.
SMOL.A, SUING THE PREsS 80-99 (1986) [hereinafter SMouLA].
40. See SM0U.1,supra note 39, at 91 (determined by a preponderance of the evidence standard).
41. See d. (determined by a clear and convincing standard).
42. See id (determined by a clear and convincing standard).
43. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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of "actual malice" and attaches to it the meaning of "ill will" or
"bad motive."" The Supreme Court in New York Times used
"actual malice" as a term of art. Under the New York Times
standard, the plaintiff in a defamation action does not need to prove
the defendant acted with "ill will," but instead must prove the
defendant knew of the falsity or acted with reckless disregard for
the truth.' Judges applying the New York Times rule must ensure
that the jury applies the technical definition and not the common
meaning of "malice." '
The meaning of "reckless disregard for the truth" has also
proved to be problematic. The Supreme Court in St. Amant v.
Thompson7 decided that a plaintiff can establish "reckless
disregard for the truth" by showing that "the defendant in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the publication."'
Although "serious doubts" is a more manageable standard, it is
still too ambiguous to be useful as precedent."
Whether the defendant subjectively had "reckless disregard for
the truth" or "knowledge of falsity" creates more problems for the
jury and ultimately for the plaintiff. For example, in Herbert v.
Lando," the Supreme Court held that during pretrial discovery a
plaintiff may investigate the publisher's state of mind to establish
44. "The phrase 'actual malice' is unfortunately confusing in that it has nothing to do with bad
motive or ill will." Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, _ U.S. _, 109 S.Ct.
2678, 2685 n.7 (1989). See Westmoreland, 596 F. Supp. 1170, 1172-73 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(suggesting attorneys use "state of mind," "deliberate or reckless falsity," or "constitutional
limitation" instead of "actual malice" in front of the jury to avoid confusion with the more common
meaning of "malice").
45. New York Times, 376 U.S. 287-88.
46. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 52 n.18 (1971) (clarifying the difference
between actual malice and common law malice).
47. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
48. Id at 731.
49. The U.S. Supreme Court in SL Amant admits that "reckless disregard" for the truth cannot
be captured in "one infallible definition." Id at 730.
50. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
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a case of reckless disregard for the truth." This procedure may be
unduly burdensome and costly to the plaintiff.'
Many plaintiffs spend great sums of money to absolve their
reputations. 3 When the plaintiff's primary goal is to clear a
harmed reputation, litigation in the United States may not be the
best course of action. Should the case be brought in a United
States court, a judge's decision to trifurcate the jury verdicte may
actually create more harm to the plaintiff's reputation.5 A special
verdict requires that the jury specifically find whether the statement
was false. If the jury does not find that the statement was false,
the public figure plaintiff's reputation may further suffer as a direct
consequence of the plaintiff's inability to establish falsehood.
Therefore, the special verdicts used by United States courts may
actually foil the plaintiff's strategies to absolve his reputation.
A general verdict may create similar difficulties in the plaintiff's
attempt to clear a harmed reputation. If the jury finds that the
plaintiff did not establish actual malice, the jury must decide in
favor of the defendant. Even if the jury finds that the statement
51. Id at 160.
52. Id The process of determining the defendant's state of mind requires hours of document
review and production, as well as deposition-taking, "[I]n order to present evidence concerning the
defendant's state of mind at the time of publication, the plaintiff needs access to the interviews, notes,
conclusions, and newsroom conversations that form the reporting and editorial processes." Wissler,
Bezanson, Cranberg & Soloski, Why Current Libel Law Doesn't Work, 27 JUDGES J. 29, 30 (1988)
[hereinafter Wissler]. This investigation is just as harmful to the defendant. As Epstein explained,
'The ability of a well-heeled or determined plaintiff to hound a defendant in discovery is an
inescapable fact of life under the present law. It was a smaller risk in common law trials that were
conducted on strict liability principles." Epstein, supra note 27, at 809.
53. Seventy-three percent of the plaintiffs reported that immediately after the story
appeared they would have been satisfied with a retraction, correction or apology.
In fact, what most of the plaintiffs had asked the media to do at that stage was to
retract or correct the story or to apologize publicly; only one percent had asked the
media to pay damages. The plaintiffs became more interested in money at the time
of the suit; but even then, most said they sued to set the record straight, not to
obtain money damages.
Wissler, supra note 52, at 30. Actress Carol Burnett stated after winning a large sum in a defamation
suit against National Inquirer, "'i]f they'd given me one dollar plus cab fare, I'd have been happy
because it was the principle." SMOLLA, supra note 39, at 111.
54. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text (illustrating a trifurcated verdict).
55. This problem will not arise in Canada and Great Britain because those countries do not
require the plaintiff to prove the falsity of the statement. See infra notes 67 & 87 and accompanying
text.
623
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 3
concerning the plaintiff was false, the general verdict for the
defendant will stand. The plaintiff may not be able to convince the
public that the jury found the defendant's statement false.
(d) Potential Benefits under the New York Times
Standard
Although defamation law in the United States clearly favors the
defendant, the public figure plaintiff may still reap some benefits
by initiating an action in the United States. For example:
Contingency fees are lawful;-6 the United States has broader
discovery rules" and higher damages 8 than other countries; and
the judgment is easier to enforce."
Even if the plaintiff loses in the United States, the plaintiff
might still "cleanse" the reputation that was harmed by the alleged
defamatory statement.' In the Sharon case, for example, the jury
returned a verdict that: 1) Time's statement was defamatory; 2) the
allegations in the defamatory statement were not true; and 3) Time
had not acted with actual malice.6' Although Sharon lost the legal
battle because he was unable to prove actual malice, the jury's
finding supported Sharon in the effort to clear his name.
Despite the potential advantages listed above, a public figure
plaintiff should attempt to avoid United States defamation law.
Damages are worthless if the plaintiff cannot establish a prima
facie case of defamation. Proving actual malice with "convincing
56. Juenger, supra note 1, at 560.
57. Id. at 561-62.
58. Desai v. Hersh, 719 F. Supp. 670,676 (N.D.Ill. 1989). "The data show a trend toward more
generous jury awards, and a corresponding trend toward the media settling suits at a substantial cost
.... [One recent] study showed that thirty out of forty-seven damage awards included punitive
damages, and seven of those punitive damage awards were for $1 million or more .... [The]
prospect of such lucrative awards is likely to entice more potential defamation plaintiffs to bring
[suit]." Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA.
L REV. 1, 4-7 (1984).
59. Desai, 719 F. Supp. at 676.
60. This poses a great risk, however, because litigating to "cleanse" one's reputation may
actually harm the plaintiffs reputation if the jury decides specifically that the defamatory statements
were not false. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
61. SMOLLA, supra note 39, at 91. The jury did add that it found certain writers negligent and
careless in reporting and verifying the information. Id. at 91-92.
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evidence" creates a virtually insurmountable obstacle for most
plaintiffs. Given the choice of substantive law, a public figure
plaintiff would have a better chance of success in jurisdictions
where a court would apply English or Canadian defamation law.
B. England
Unlike United States law, English defamation. law derives not
from a constitution, but from case and statutory law.' No express
freedom of speech exists in England as exists in the United
States.63 In contrast to the United States courts' requirement that
the statement be "about the plaintiff," an English court may hold
a media defendant liable for a statement even though the media had
no reason to believe the statement referred to the plaintiff."
Damage to reputation, an element that the public figure plaintiff
must prove by a preponderance of evidence in the United States,
is presumed under English law.' United States defamation law
requires the plaintiff to prove the falsity of the statement.' In
England the plaintiff does not have this burden. The defendant
rebuts the allegations by proving the truth of the statement,' or by
proving that the statement was made in fair comment.' Although
English law clearly favors the plaintiff and does not provide an
62. Despite the constitutional authority on freedom of speech, the English courts "frequently
invoke a common law principle of freedom of speech... to limit the scope of other common law
rules which inhibit the freedom." BARENDT, supra note 27, at 29-30 (1987). Defamation under
English law is a publication of words or matter to a third person containing an untrue imputation
against another's reputation. GATLEY ON LtBEL AND SLANDER ch. 1, § 1, at 4 (8th ed. 1981)
[hereinafter GATLEY].
63. Some scholars suggest that Britain develop a Bill of Rights, containing a constitutional free
speech clause, to ensure that Britain will always recognize that freedom. Id. at 304-07.
64. BARENDT, supra note 27, at 181 (stating that this puts great restrictions on freedom of
speech).
65. Id. at 178.
66. See supra note 6 and accompanying texL
67. See GATLEY, supra note 62, ch. II, at 150 (citing Bek, 51 LJ.Q.B. at 361 (law presumes
defamatory words are false)).
68. BAREDT, supra note 27, at 178-79 (describing the controversy as to whether fair comment
must be "honestly expressed" or whether the standard should be more objective); see generally
GATEMY, supra note 62, ch. 15, § 1, at 290 (describing the qualifications for "fair comment" as
those "in which the public has a legitimate interest or with which it is legitimately concerned").
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express right to freedom of expression, a defendant in a defamation
action still has some protection.
1. The European Convention on Human Rights
A defendant to whom England has denied a right to freedom of
expression may seek a remedy under the European Convention on
Human Rights (Convention).' The purpose of the Convention is
to ensure rights and freedoms 0 of the citizens of the Convention
members (Contracting Parties).7' Article Ten of the Convention
guarantees freedom of expression, limiting it to restrictions which
"are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society
for national or safety interest or necessary for the interest of
69. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 222 (Sept. 3, 1953), T.S. 71 (1953) [hereinafter Convention]. Great Britain is a party
to the Convention. Id. "'The Commission may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies
have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law." Id. at art. 26.
The media defendants in the "'Spycatcher" case, for example, may appeal to the European Court
because the British government has enjoined them from printing material from a book copies of
which have already disseminated into Great Britain. See infra notes 109-29 and accompanying text
(discussing the facts of Spycatcher). The dissenting opinion of Bridge, J. in Att'y Gen. v. Guardian
Newspapers (No. 1) 1 W.L.R. 1248 (1987), discusses the effect of the Convention on Great Britain:
"We have not adopted as part of our law the European Convention on Human Rights... to which
this country is a signatory. Many think that we should." Justice Scott, however, explained:
Counsel for the Attorney-General submitted that the judgments of the
European Court of Human Rights did not bind an English court as to the
manner in which para (2) of art. 10. should be construed or applied. But
if it is right to take into account the government's convention obligatigns
under art. 10, the article must, in my view, be given a meaning and effect
consistent with the ruling of the court established by the convention to
supervise application.
Att'y Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers, 1990 A.C. 109, 3 All E.R. 545 (Scott, J.) (1988).
70. Convention, supra note 69, at § I, art. 2-12 (describing the rights provided for in the
Convention as: Right to life; freedom from slavery and servitude; freedom from arbitrary arrest,
exile, or detention; the right to a fair trial; freedom of religion, thought, and conscience; freedom of
opinion and expression; freedom of assembly and association; freedom to unite in trade unions; and
right to marry and have a family).
71. Id. at § I, art. 1. The following countries are signatories to the Convention: Austria,
Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey,
and the United Kingdom. Iel
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others."' The European Court of Human Rights (European Court)
provides a vehicle for securing these rights and freedoms.73
Before the European Court will hear a case, the Contracting
Party must either accept the Court's jurisdiction on its own accord
or be compelled to accept jurisdiction.7' Only the following
parties can pursue a remedy in the European Court of Human
Rights: (1) The Convention's Commission;" (2) a Contracting
Party whose citizen is alleged to have had his rights violated; (3)
a Contracting Party who referred the case to the Commission; or
(4) a Contracting Party against whom the complainant brings the
action."'
The European Court must follow the procedure prescribed in the
Convention. First, the Convention Commission must attempt to
settle the case." If the Commission cannot successfully settle the
72. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema
enterprises.
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions
or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
Ua. at § I, art. 10.
73. Id. at § H, art. 19(1) (creating a European Court of Human Rights to "ensure the observance
of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties").
74. A Contracting Party accepts jurisdiction either by "declaring that it recognizes as
compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement the jurisdiction of the Court in all matters
concerning the interpretation and application of the present Convention" or by consent. Convention,
supra note 69, at § IV, arts. 46, 48.
75. Id. at § II, art. 19(2) (setting up the European Commission of Human Rights). The
Commission is composed of the same number of members as those representing the Contracting
Parties. Ma. at § III, art. 20. No two members can be nationals of the same state. Id. "The principal
function of the Commission is to investigate alleged breaches of the Convention, and to secure, if
possible, a friendly settlement of the matter." A. RoBERMTSON, HuMAN i-RGHTS IN EUROPE 43 (1963).
See i. at § III, arts. 25(1), 28(b).
76. Convention, supra note 69, at § IV, art. 48.
77. Id. at § III, art. 28. The Commission can hear a matter only once the parties have
exhausted all domestic remedies, according to the international law, and only within a period of six
months from the date on which the final decision of the domestic courts was made. Id at § MI, art.
627
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. j
case, then the Commission must draft a report to present to the
Court describing the facts of the dispute and indicating whether a
breach of the Convention has occurred.78 The Commission sends
the report to a committee of the Council of Europe, which must
decide by a two-thirds vote that a violation of the Convention has
occurred." Once the Council has attained a two-thirds vote, the
court may take jurisdiction over the action. If the Court has
jurisdiction under this procedure, then the Court will hear the~81case.8
In Lingens v. Austria, the European Court considered the
social need for freedom of expression in a democratic society and
determined that there must be an uninhibited expression of
opinion. 3 The Court held that the media defendant cannot be
expected to prove the truth, because this burden of proof would
infringe upon free speech." The Court adopted the same rule as
that in New York Times for proving falsity. The burden of proof
is on the public figure plaintiff to prove that the defamatory
statement was false." Placement of the burden of proof on a
public figure plaintiff serves to protect a media defendant in a
society which has no express rights to freedom of expression.
Thus, the fact that England has no express right to freedom of
expression does not leave the defendant completely unprotected.
26. If the Commission successfully settles the case, then it must distribute a report to the interested
countries and to the Council of Europe. Id. at § EI, art. 30.
78. Id at § II art. 31.
79. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe will review the report. l at § III,
art. 32.
80. Convention, supra note 69, at § I, art. 32. If the question is properly referred to the Court
within three months from the date of the transmission of the report, then no such vote need take
place. See id. The Committee of Ministers must then prescribe measures that the Contracting Party
must satisfy within a certain period of time. let at § I, art. 32(2). If the Contracting Party does not
satisfy those measures within the specified time, then the Committee of Ministers must vote by a
two-thirds majority on what effect should be given to its original decision. Id at § III, art. 32(3).
81. The Court is comprised of the same number of members as the number in the Council of
Europe; no two nationals may be representatives of the same state. Id. at § IV, art. 38. The judges
are elected for a nine-year period on a staggered basis. Convention, supra note 69, at § IV, art. 40.
The Court consists of seven judges and an ex officio member. Id. at § IV, art. 43.
82. Lingens v. Austria, 8 E.H.R.R. 407 (1986).
83. Id. at 419.
84. Id. at 420-21.
85. Id
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C. Canada
Canadian defamation law is similar to English defamation law.
A defendant is liable under Canadian defamation law if he "falsely
... publish(es] defamatory statements concerning the plaintiff.""'
Like England, Canada makes no distinction between public and
private figure plaintiffs. Canadian law presumes that the
defamatory statement is false; a defendant who can show that the
allegedly defamatory statement can be justified,' is privileged,"
or qualifies as fair comment!' has successfully defended against
the action. However, the plaintiff may rebut the qualified privilege
86. 8 C.E.D. title 45, part I, § 9, at 38 (Ont. 3rd) (Aug. 1990). The general test for defamiation
is: "would the words tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of
society generally?" Id. § 2, at 35 (quoting Sims v. Stretch, 52 T.L.R. 669, 671 (H.L) (1936)). The
factfinder must decide whether the statement is defamatory. However, the judge can withhold from
thejury any meaning alleged by one of the parties that the judge decides the words cannot reasonably
bear. Id part III, § 62, at 54 (citing Amott v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Sask, S.C.R.
538 (1954) (S.C.C.)). A plaintiff suing for libel against a newspaper from Ontario or with respect
to a broadcast made in Ontario must bring the action within three months of the time the defamed
person has knowledge of the defamation. CARTER-RucK ON LBEL AND SL.ANDER 275 (3rd ed.
1985). The notice must specify the name and address of the publisher or the name and address of
any owner or operator of any broadcasting station that the plaintiff is suing. Id.
87. 8 C.E.D. title 45, part V, § 143, at 83 (Ont. 3rd) (Aug. 1990) (citing Lockington v. Siegrist
& Co., O.R. 402, 3 D.LR. 566 (Ont. C.A.) (1935)). The plaintiff must prove the whole truth of the
libel. Id (citing Drost v. Sunday Herald, 11 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 342 (Nfld. T.D.) (1976)).
88. An allegedly defamatory communication constitutes a qualified privilege when it "has been
made in the discharge of a legal, social or moral duty, or on a matter in which there is a common
interest between parties." I 4 part X, § 191, at 104 (citing Adam v. Ward, A.C. at 334 (1917) (H.i)).
The judge must decide whether the matter constitutes a qualified privilege, as it is a question of law.
Id. Statements made during judicial proceedings and executive communications are absolutely
privileged. Id. part IX, § 176, at 97.
89. A statement qualifies as "'fair comment" if it meets the following elements. First, it must
be based on true facts. Id. part VII, § 157, at 87 (citing Whitaker v. Huntington, 15 C.C.LT. 19
(1980) (B.C. S.C.)). The burden is on the defendant to prove that it is so based. 8 C.E.D. title 45,
part VII, § 157, at 87 (Ont. 3rd) (Aug. 1990) (citing Planned Parenthood Nfld/Labrador v. Fedorik,
135 D.L.R.(3d) 714 (Nfld. T.D.) (1982)). Second, the statement must be the honest expression or
the real view of the person making the comment. Id. Fair comment only protects opinion, not fact.
Id. § 160, at 88-89 (citing Christie v. Geiger, 35 Alta. L.R. (2d) 316 (Alta. Q.B.X1984)). The
"fairness" is determined by honesty, not reasonableness. Id. § 163, at 90 (citing Vander Zalm v.
T7unes Publishers, 4 W.W.R. 259 (B.C. CA.) (1980)). Finally, the allegedly defamatory matter must
be of public interest. I&. § 168, at 91-92 (citing Chernesky v. Armadale Publishers, 1 S.C.R. 1067
(S.C.C.)(1979)).
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and fair comment defenses by proving the presence of express
malice."
1. Policy
Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms? (Charter) is similar
to the United States Bill of Rights.92  The effect of its language,
however, renders it less like freedom of the press under United
States law and more like English defamation law. 3 Freedom of
the press in Canada originally derived from case law.9' In 1961,
the Canadian government passed a dominion statute, guaranteeing
freedom of the press."
A dominion statute, however, does not have authority over the
entire Canadian federal system.' Ii Gay Alliance Toward
Equality v. Vancouver Sun,"e the British Columbia Supreme Court
alluded to Section l(f) of the Dominion Statute which guarantees
freedom of the press,98 but did not clarify whether this statement
90. Id. part I, § 9, at 38 (citing Moore v. Salter, 37 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 128 (Nfld. Dist. Ct)
(1982)). The plaintiff must prove that the defendant had a motive other than to express his real
opinion. 8 C.E.D. title 45, part VIII, § 170, at 94 (Ont. 3rd) (Aug. 1990) (citing Chemesky, 1 S.C.R.
1067 (S.C.C.)). The burden is on the plaintiff to prove express malice. Id.
91. CANADIAN CHARTER OFRiGHTS AND FREEDOMS ANNOTATED (1982) [hereinafter CHARTER].
92. Compare the Convention, part 1, § II ("Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
[F]reedom of thought belief and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of
information.") with U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press .... ").
93. See infra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
94. Doody, Freedom of the Press, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and a New
Category of Qualified Privilege, 61 CAN. B. REv. 124, 131 (1983) (citing Reference re: Alberta
Legislation, 2 D.LR. 2d 343 (1961) ("Albert Press Bill case") (guaranteeing freedom of the press,
considered "implied in a democratic society")). "Even the Alberta Press Reference, which is
generally considered to be the classic statement concerning freedom of expression in Canada, did not
establish that freedom of expression had an independent existence which could not be abrogated or
abridged by Parliament." Beckton, Freedom of Expression-Access to the Courts, 61 CAN. B. REV.
101, 102 (1983).
95. Doody, supra note 94, at 131 (citing R.S.C. 1970, app. IlI).
96. Id, at 131 (1983) (describing the weak effect of the Dominion Statute "The Canadian Bill
of Rights").
97. Id, at 132 & n.32 (citing 97 D.L.R. (3d) 577 (S.C.C.) (1979)).
98. Id, at 131 (citing R.S.C. 70, § 1(f)).
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was dictum or precedent.' Therefore, Section l(f) still may not
be binding.
2. The Canadian Charter on Rights and Freedoms and New
York Times v. Sullivan
In 1981, Canada adopted its first constitution, the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.1" Section Two of the Charter
guarantees freedom of speech."0 ' Section thirty-two states that the
Charter applies only to "the Parliament and government of
Canada" and the "legislature and government of each
province.""1 Despite this limiting provision, some have argued
that the Charter and its provisions for freedom of expression should
apply to private actions as well as to actions initiated by the
government and legislature."2 Case law in the lower Canadian
courts seems to indicate, however, that a more substantial tie to
"state action" must exist in order to be able to invoke the freedom
of speech provision of the Charter. Coates v. Citizen," decided
after adoption of the Charter, gives persuasive though not binding
proof that the Charter was intended to have the same effect on
private defamation actions as the Constitution in the United States:
99. Doody, supra note 94, at 134 (citing Gay Alliance, 97 D.LR. at 589-90).
100. CHARTER, supra note 91.
101. "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms;... (b) freedom of thought, belief,
opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of information." Id. at §
2.
102. Id. at § 32.
103. See Doody, supra note 94, at 149-50. Doody bases his rationale on the fact that the
Charter is a constitution, thus encompassing much more than the language. Id. He also argues that
individuals are bound by a general law, so there is no reason to specify the application of individual
rights. Id. Finally, Doody analogizes Canadian freedom of speech to the United States freedom of
speech standards in New York Times v. Sullivan, explaining that the New York Tunes standard is
necessary in a democratic system. Id.
In Constitutional Law of Canada, Peter W. Hogg compares the development of case law and
the Charter with New York Times v. Sullivan and the Constitution. Hoo, CoNSTrmuONAL LAW
OF CANADA 678 (1985). He asserts that New York Times may be interpreted as government or state
action because the state court's order awarded damages to the plaintiff. Id. Applying this analysis
to the Charter's freedom of speech provision would imply that the Charter's guarantee applies to any
action brought in court which involved private activity. Id.
104. Coates v. Citizen, 85 N.S.R. (2d) 146 (1988).
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While in the United States a public official must prove 'actual malice' on
the part of the press in an action for defamation, in Canada, the onus
shifts to the defendant once the plaintiff has established the impugned
statement is defamatory. This reflects the Canadian view that the press
should receive no special protection in the law of defamation."
The Nova Scotia Supreme Court explained that since a defamation
action involves two private citizens and the Charter covers only
state actions, in most defamation cases the Charter does not apply.
However, the court decided that this case invoked the Charter
because the plaintiff was challenging the constitutionality of a
defamation statute." Because the Charter guarantees freedom of
speech, but does not apply to private actions, Canadian defamation
law appears to be more similar to English law than to United States
law.
In conclusion, the United States, Canada, and England uniquely
balance the rights of privacy and freedom of expression in their
defamation laws. Placing a harsh burden on the publi figure
plaintiff to prove a prima facie case, the United States courts
heavily emphasize freedom of speech. England tilts decidedly in
favor of the right to privacy. However, the European Court of
Human Rights, to which England is a signatory, applies the same
policy as New York Times. England therefore appears to have
conflicting policies: A national policy which favors right to
privacy, and an international policy which carefully protects
freedom of speech. Canada also has conflicting policies behind its
defamation laws. Although Canada has adopted a constitution
guaranteeing freedom of speech, the lower courts have applied this
guarantee only to state actions. The differences in law and policy
between the United States, Canada, and England raise interesting
legal issues, particularly in situations involving more than one
jurisdiction.
.105. CHARTE at § 2(b): 240010 (citing and summarizing Coates v. Citizen, 85 N.S.R. (2d)
146).
106. d at § 32(1): 90060 (citing and summarizing Coates v. Citizen, 10 A.C.W.S. (3d) 112
(N.S.S.C.) (1988)).
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I. JURISDICTION AND CHOICE OF LAW
A. Introduction
Thus far, this comment has analyzed the present state of
defamation law in the United States, England, and Canada. Each
country has a distinct policy, a unique balance between freedom of
expression and the right to privacy. Modem technology, however,
has created a world where defamatory statements originating in one
country may be disseminated thousands of miles away." When
transnational defamation occurs, what law should apply? For
example, if the plaintiff resides in England, the defendant resides
in the United States, and the defendant published the defamatory
book in Canada, which country's laws should the court apply? By
applying one country's substantive laws over another, the court
may be denying a party protections guaranteed by the other
country's laws. Two recent cases illustrate the problems created by
discrete policies in a modem world.
1. "Spycatcher"
Although neither a defamation nor a "forum shopping" case,
"Spycatcher""' demonstrates that activities in one country may
107. With the advent of satellite communication and the propensity in the very
near future for millions of domestic and commercial receivers to pick up
transmissions from throughout the world, it may soon be commonplace for
the desks of... lawyers to be laden with points of law initiated, in some
cases, from the other side of the world. One such point of law will
inevitably involve defamation.
Cooper, supra note 3.
108. Her Majesty's Att'y Gen. v. Newspaper Publishing, Court of Appeal (Civil Division),
The Times 28 February 1990, The Independent 28 February 1990, (Transcript: Association, 27
February); Att'y Gdn. v. Newspaper Publishing, Chancery Division, F.S.R. 457 (1989); Att'y Gen.
v. Guardian Newspapers, House of Lords, 1990 A.C. 109, 3 All E.R. 545 (1989), 3 W.L.R. 776
(1989); Att'y Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers (No.2); Att'y Gen. v. Observor, Att'y Gen. v. Times
Newspapers, Court of Appeal (Civil Division), 3 All E.R. 545 (1988), 2 W.L.R. 805 (1988); Att'y
Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers, Chancery Division, 1990 A.C. 109,3 All E.R. 545 (1988); Att'y Gen.
v. Observor, Chancery Division, 1 All E.R. 385 (1988); Heinemann Publishers Australia Proprietary
v. Hooligan Press, Chancery Division, (Transcript: Marten Walsh Cherer) (1987); Att'y Gen. v.
Guardian Newspapers, House of Lords, I W.LR. 1248 (1987); Att'y Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers,
Court of Appeal (Civil Division), I W.L.R. 1248 (1987); Att'y Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers, Court
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infringe upon the effectiveness of laws or judgments rendered in
another country. Wright, former Assistant Director of MI5, wrote
a book which revealed secrets about the British Secret Service.1 9
Wright planned to publish the book, Spycatcher, in Australia."'
In June 1986, two English newspapers, the Guardian and the
Observer, published articles recounting Wright's allegations
concerning the secret service."' The British Attorney General
brought suit against Wright in Australia to prevent publication of
the book."' The British government argued that Wright had a
lifelong obligation of confidence to the British Secret Service.'
An Australian court denied the injunction; the Attorney General
lost his appeal in the higher courts.1 '
The English High Court temporarily enjoined the two British
newspapers from disclosing any further information directly or
of Appeal (Civil Division), (Transcript: Association) (1987); Att'y Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers,
Chancery Division, 1 W.L.R. 1248 (1987); Att'y Gen. v. Newspaper Publishing, Court of Appeal
(Civil Division), 1 Ch. 333 (1988), 3 All E.R. 276 (1987), 3 W.L.R. 942 (1987).
109. WRIGHT, SPYCATCHER (1987).
Some of the information in Spycatcher, if true, disclosed that members of
M15 in their operations in England had committed serious breaches of
domestic law. The bugging of foreign embassies is an example.
Unlawful entry into private premises is another. Most serious of all is the
allegation that members of MI5 embarked, albeit unofficially, on activities
designed to destabilize the administration of Mr. Harold Wilson [former
British Prime Minister].
Att'y Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers (No. 2), Court of Appeal (Civil Division), 3 All E.R. 545 (1988),
2 W.L.R. 805 (1988) (Scott, J.). See N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1988, at A5, col. 1 (stating that the book
accuses the M15 chief of being a double agent working for the Soviets). "'The book also asserts that
the security service... bungled operations, stole documents [and] plotted to assassinate President
Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt....' N.Y. Times, supra.
110. See Att'y Gen. (U.K.) v. Heinemann Publishers, 75 A.LR. 461 (1987). Mr. Wright had
been retired and living in Australia since 1976. N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1988, at AS, col. 1.
111. Her Majesty's Attorney-General v. Newspaper Publishing, Court of Appeal (Civil
Division) (Transcript: Association) (1990).
112. Heinemann, 75 A.LR. 461 (1987).
113. "I regard this case as having established that members and former members of the
security service do have a lifelong obligation of confidence owed to the Crown." Att'y Gen. v.
Guardian Newspapers, 3 All E.R. 545 (1988), 3 W.LR. 776 (1989) (Keith, LJ.). See Att'y Gen.
(U.K.) v. Heinemann, 75 A.LR. 353 (1987) ("[A]ppellant [Attorney General of the U.K.]
commenced an action seeking an injunction ... relying on evidence ... that [the] publication of
Spycatcher was detrimental to the national security of [the U.K.]."
114. Att'y Gen. (U.K.) v. Heineman Publishers, 75 A.L.R. 353 (1987) (decision of the Court
of Appeal, New South Wales). Heineman v. Att'y Gen. (U.K), 75 A.L.R. 461 (1987) (decision of
the Australian Supreme Court).
1990/Defamation Via Modern Communication
indirectly obtained from Wright."' Other British newspapers
printed details of Wright's book during the following year." 6 A
New York publisher then printed Spycatcher in its entirety in the
United States; the book quickly became a U.S. best seller."7 The
two newspapers which originally printed excerpts of Wright's book
applied for the injunctions to be lifted, and based their reasoning
on the fact that the material had already been circulated worldwide
following the U.S. publication."1 The House of Lords upheld the
High Court's decision to lift the injunctions.
119
This case demonstrates England's attempt to preserve its policy
of right to privacy. The court penalized other newspapers which
printed Spycatcher excerpts even though they were not specifically
enjoined from printing material on Wright; the purpose of the
penalty was to deter future publishers from engaging in similar
acts. 20  In a further effort to preserve its policy, the English
Parliament recently passed two acts, the Official Secrets Act
1989121 and the Security Service Act 1989,"2 both of which
increase protection of, and restrict freedom to, information relating
115. 2 F.S.R. 3 (Millett, J.) (1989) (known as the "Miilett Injunctions"). The Court of
Appeal affirmed. See Her Majesty's Att'y Gen. v. Newspaper Publishing, (Transcript: Association)
(Fox, LJ.) (1990) (describing history of the case).
116. Her Majesty's Att'y Gen. v. Newspaper Publishing, Court of Appeal (Civil Division),
(Transcript: Association) (1990).
117. See N.Y. Tines, Mar. 8, 1988, at C 13, col. 1. See also id., Oct. 14, 1988, at AS, coL
1 (stating that Spycatcher had remained on the New York Times Book Review's Best Sellers List for
ten weeks and that the book has sold 1.4 million copies in 40 countries).
118. Att'y Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers (No.2), Court of Appeal (Civil Division), 3 All E.R.
545 (1988), 2 W.L.R. 805 (1988) (Scott, LJ.).
119. Att'y Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers (No. 2), House of Lords, 1990 A.C. 109 (1988),
3 All E.R. 545 (1989) (Keith, LJ.) See N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1988, at A5, col. 1. After this
decision, Spycatcher has been sold in Britain without any penalties. The British court did, however,
impose fines on several newspapers for publishing portions or details of the Wright book during the
injunction. See Att'y Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers (No. 2), Court of Appeal (Civil Division), 3 All
E.R. 545 (1988), 2 W.L.R. 805 (1988). These newspapers appealed to the House of Lords; the
newspapers argued that injunctions against some newspapers should not prohibit other newspapers
from printing certain material. The House of Lords affirmed the Court of Appeals decision. Att'y
Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers, 1990 A.C. 109 (1988), 3 All E.R. 545 (1988), 3 W.L.R. 776 (1989)
(Keith, LJ.).
120. See Att'y Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers, 1990 A.C. 109 (1988), 3 All E.R. 545 (1988),
3 W.L.R. 776 (1989).
121. Official Secrets Act 1986 (c 6), May 11, 1989.
122. Security Services Act 1989 (c 5), Apr. 27, 1989.
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to the security services. These actions suggest further restrictions
on speech in the future. "
Despite these attempts to preserve English policy, the fact
remains that the British government failed to keep the Secret
Service information from being disseminated into England."
England's policy of restricting freedom of speech for purposes of
national security"s was undermined by other countries' policies
of unrestricted freedom of speech."6 The "Spycatcher" case shows
the effects of one country's laws on another. The case also
demonstrates the tremendous amount of time and money that can
be expended to uphold traditional policies. 27 As the judges in
these cases indicated in their opinions, the courts have a difficult,
123. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1988, at 10, col. I (describing the British Government's
attempt to censor a second spy book).
124. As one British politician remarked, -[The British Government] made Britain a laughing-
stock from America to Australia." N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1988, at AS, col. 1 (quoting Roy Hattersley,
spokesman fof the Labor Party).
125. [I]n my opinion a democracy is entitled to take the view that a public
servant who is employed in the security service must be restrained from
making any disclosures concerning the security service and that similar
restraints must be imposed on anybody who receives those disclosures
knowing that they are confidential....
Att'y Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers, House of Lords, I W.L.R. 1248 (1987) (Templeman, LJ.).
126. If the publication of this book in America is to have, for all practical
purposes, the effect of nullifying the jurisdiction of the English courts to
enforce compliance with the duty of confidence both by interlocutory and
by permanent injunction, then, as [counsel for the Attorney General]
ruefully observed, English law would have surrendered to the American
Constitution. There the courts, by virtue of the First Amendment, are, I'
understand, powerless to control the press. Fortunately, the press in this
country is, as yet, not above the law, although like other powerful
organizations they would like that to be so, that is until they require the
law's protection.
Id (Lord Ackner).
I would stress that I do not base this on any balancing of public interest
nor on any considerations of freedom of the press, nor on any possible
defences of prior publicationor just cause or excuse, but simply on the
view that all possible damage to the interest of the Crown has already
been done by the publication of Spycatcher abroad and the ready
availability of copies in this country.
Att'y Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers, House of Lords, 1990 A.C. 109, 3 All E.R. 545 (1988), 3
W.LR. 776 (1989) (Keith, U.). See N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1988, at AS, col. 1.
127. "The Government estimates that its legal battle has cost $994,750, but legal experts say
it could be as much as $5 million." N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1988, at AS, col. 1.
636
1990/Defamation Via Modern Communication
if not impossible, task of upholding national policies when
worldwide media is involved."
2. Pindling v. NBC"S
Like the "Spycatcher" case, Pindling v. NBC raises issues
involving conflicting policies. In 1983 and 1984, NBC aired
programs in the United States that tied Pindling, former Bahamian
Prime Minister, to drug dealers."'o NBC affiliates broadcast the
128. [I]n the United States,... over a million copies have been distributed and
... dissemination of the information contained therein has taken place on
a worldwide scale. Anyone in this country who wants the book can
obtain a copy. Thousands of people have read the book. In these
circumstances, whatever duty newspapers and others may originally have
had to refrain from disclosing the information contained in the book, the
information has lost its confidential or secret character and the
newspapers' duty has evaporated and gone.
Att'y Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers (No. 2), Court of Appeal (Civil Division), 3 All E.R. 545 (1988),
2 W.L.R. 805 (1988) (Scott, J.).
The case has also served a useful purpose in bringing to light the
problems which arise when the obligation of confidence is breached by
publication abroad.... Consideration should be given to the possibility
of some international agreement aimed at reducing the risks to collective
security in the present state of affairs... Some degree of comity and
reciprocity in this respect would seem desirable in order to promote. the
common interests of allied nations.
Att'y Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers (No. 2), House of Lords, 1990 A.C. 109,3 All E.R. 545 (1989),
3 W.LR. 776 (1988) (Keith, LJ.). A recent decision in New York demonstrates the conflict between
national security and freedom of speech. Israeli author Victor Ostrovsky wrote a book about his
experience as a Mossad intelligence agent in Israel. A Canadian court temporarily enjoined the
book's Canadian publisher from releasing the book until the court could hold a hearing on the issue.
The New York Supreme Court likewise temporarily barred a United States publisher from selling the
book in the United States. The New York Supreme Court apparently granted the injunction in
response to the Israeli government's fear that publication could endanger lives. WAIL ST. J., at B4,
col. 5 (Sept. 13, 1990). The appellate division overturned the ban, holding, "Mhe Israeli
government has failed to overcome the heavy presumption against prior restraint on publication."
WALL ST. J., at B2, cols. 1, 2 (Sept. 14, 1990) (emphasis added).
129. Pindling v. NBC, 49 O.R. (2d) 58 (1984).
130. /,. at 61. Plaintiff's Statement of Claim at 6-7, Pindling v. NBC, Supreme Court of
Ontario, District of York (17549/84) (1984). Plaintiff's Statement of Claim, supra, at 8 (alleging that
the statement broadcast "[was] understood to mean that the [p]laintiff had taken bribes from drug
smugglers, that he had used his position as Prime Minister to his own advantage and to protect drug
smugglers, that he was dishonest and corrupt, and that he was guilty of criminal acts and therefore
unworthy to hold the office of Prime Minister"). The broadcasted statement included the following
language: "A Justice Department Intelligence report says Vesco [an alleged drug dealer] has been.
.. *allegedly paying approximately $100,000 per month to Bahamian officials, including the Prime
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programs to the U.S.-Canadian border.' Canadian cable
companies furthered the programs to Canadian televisions."
Pindling initiated defamation proceedings against NBC in the
Bahamas. NBC did not appear; the Bahamian court did not award
Pindling the $2 million compensatory and $2 million punitive
damages he sought.' Pindling then brought an action against
NBC in Canada." F. Lee Bailey, a lawyer for Pindling,
conceded that one reason he brought suit in Canada rather than the
United States was that "there is no future for a public figure [in a
U.S. defamation action]!'"" Based on this reasoning, Pindling
initiated proceedings in a country in which the defendants did not
intentionally broadcast the programs."
The "Spycatcher" and Pindling cases present interesting issues
involving overlapping national policies. The next section will
analyze these issues in the context of conflicts of law. In each
case, the forum court faces two fundamental questions: Does the
forum court have jurisdiction to hear the case and what law
applies?
Minister.'" Plaintiff's Statement of Claim, supra, app. A, at 3-4. See Plaintiffs Statement of Claim,
supra, app. E, at 1-2 & 4 (other allegedly defamatory statements against Sir Lynden Pindling).
131. Pindling, 49 O.R. (2d) at 61. Plaintiff's Statement of Claim, supra note 130, at 7.
132. Pindling, 49 O.R. (2d) at 61.
133. Id See Wall St. J., June 6, 1989, at BI, coL 3.
134. Id at 58. See WAU ST. J., Oct. 11, 1989, at B8, col. 2.
135. The real advantage to the plaintiff in bringing the action in Ontario is that
it is not necessary to establish 'actual malice'. Actual malice would have
to be proved in the United States, that is that NBC broadcast the
programmes with knowledge of their falsity, or with reckless disregard of
whether they were true or false.
Pindling, 49 OR. (2d) at 65. DeBenedictis, Moving Abroad: Libel Plaintiffs Say It's Easier Suing
U.S. Media EFsewhere, 75 A.B.A. J. 38 (Sept. 1989).
136. Pindling, 49 O.R. (2d) at 64 (counsel for NBC arguing that NBC has not done business
in Ontario).
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B. Personal Jurisdiction'3"
1. United States
In order for jurisdiction to lie in a United States court,
maintaining the suit in the forum must not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."'" The defendant
must have "minimum contacts" with the forum." The U.S.
Supreme Court has explained the "minimum contacts" requirement
in several cases. If the defendant "purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State," then that
party has established the requisite "minimum contacts" with that
state." A defendant must "reasonably anticipate being haled"
into the forum court."' A defendant who "purposefully directs"
a product to a state through the "stream of commerce" also has
established "minimum contacts" with that state." 2
In addressing the minimum contacts issue in the context of a
defamation action, the lower courts initially found that the strong
policy of freedom of speech requires a "defendant [in a defamation
action to] have a closer relationship to the state than would
otherwise be required."" The U.S. Supreme Court in Calder v.
Jones'" rejected this argument and held that the first amendment
does not require that a special relationship exist between the
defendant and the state."
137. Because this comment does not directly involve the issue of jurisdiction, it will not
explore the law of personal jurisdiction in depth.
138. Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
139. ld.
140. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
141. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). To determine
"reasonableness," the courts examine certain factors, including: "Mhe forum's State's interest in
adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; the
interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the
shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies." Id. at 292.
142. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 110-12 (1987).
143. New York 'limes v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1966).
144. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
145. "[IThe potential chill on protected First Amendment activities stemming from libel and
defamation actions is already taken into account in the constitutional limitations on the subtantive
laws concerning such suits.... To reintroduce those concerns at the jurisdiction stage would be a
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Keeton v. Hustler' illustrates the significance of personal
jurisdiction in a defamation action. In Keeton, the plaintiff brought
a defamation suit in a New Hampshire state court against Hustler
magazine. New Hampshire was the only state where the statute of
limitations had not run.'" Although only 15,000 copies of the
magazine were sold per month in New Hampshire, the Keeton
court found personal jurisdiction because Hustler magazine had
continuously and intentionally exploited the New Hampshire
market.'"
The Keeton case provides an array of intriguing jurisdictional
issues. If a party circulates 100 copies of a magazine in California
and the magazine's general circulation is five million copies a
month, will a California court have the requisite "minimum
contacts?" If Hustler magazine knows that its magazines are being
resold in another country, has Hustler "purposefully availed" itself
in that country? Or, applying the facts of Pindling, if NBC
affiliates picked up the NBC program, broadcast it on the U.S.-
Canadian border, and Canadian televisions picked up the program,
did NBC "purposefully direct" the program in the "stream of
commerce" to Canada? A court may very well find jurisdiction in
each of these situations because the defendant has, either through
its own intentional actions or, knowingly through the acts of others,
created a market in the jurisdiction.
A related jurisdictional issue is forum non conveniens. A United
States court which is empowered to exercise jurisdiction may
choose not to exercise that power under certain circumstances. If
the action would be more convenient in another jurisdiction for all
parties involved, the court may grant a defendant's motion to
dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens."' The factors
form of double-counting." Calder, 465 U.S. at 790.
146. Keeton, 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
147. Id. at 773.
148. Id. at 781.
149. The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist
imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the
letter of a general venue statute. These statutes are drawn with a
necessary generality and usually give a plaintiff a choice of courts, so that
he may be quite sure of some place in which to pursue his remedy. But
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United States courts use to determine whether a case should be
dismissed and retried in a more convenient forum include: (1) The
relative ease of access to evidence; (2) the convenience to the
witnesses; (3) whether another court could more easily compel
witnesses unwilling to attend the trial; (4) the cost to the parties
and the court; (5) public interest; and (6) local interest.'"° The
court must weigh these factors when deciding if a case would be
more conveniently heard in another forum. A United States court
may not hear the merits of a case if the court determines either that
the forum does not have significant contacts with the cause of
action (jurisdiction) or that the forum is not convenient (forum non
conveniens).
2. Personal Jurisdiction in England and Canada
England and Canada base jurisdiction in tort actions on whether
the tort was committed in the forum.' In defamation cases, the
English and Canadian courts decide where the tort was committed
the open door may admit those who seek not simply justice but perhaps
justice blended with some harassment. A plaintiff sometimes is under
temptation to resort to a strategy of forcing the trial at a most inconvenient
place for an adversary, even at some inconvenience to himself.
Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947).
150. Id. at 508.
151. McLnoD, THE CoNFLcr oF LAws 97 & n.131 (1983) (citing Ontario Rules of Practice,
R. 25(l)(g), (h); British Columbia Supreme Court Rules, R. 13(l)(h); Manitoba Queen's Bench Rules,
R. 28(h); New Brunswick Supreme Ct. Rules, 0. 11, R. l(l)(e); Alberta Supreme Court Rules, R.
30(h); and England 0. 11, R. 1(1)(h)). The court also may find jurisdiction if the defendant is
domiciled or ordinarily a resident within the jurisdiction. Id. at 92 & n.81 (citing Alberta Supreme
Court Rules, R. 30(c); British Columbia Supreme Court Rules, R. 13(l)(d); Manitoba Queen's Bench
Rules, R. 28(d); New Brunswick's Supreme Court Rules, 0.11, 1LI(l)(c), Ontario Rules of Practice,
R. 2 5(l)(p); Saskatchewan Queen's Bench Rules, R. 31(1)(c)). While a person can (and must) have
only one domicile at any one time, the person may have more than one residence. Id. at 92.
"Domicile" means a person's permanent home. Id. at 140 & n.20 (citing Lord Cranworth from his
opinion in Whicker v. Hume, 7 H.L. Cas. 124, 160 (1858)). "'Ordinary residence", on the other
hand, is the place where a person traditionally returns; the place where his life is settled. Id. at 92.
In an action for breach of contract, jurisdiction may lie where the breach occurred. Id. at 94 & n.99
(citing Ontario Rules of Practice, R. 25(l)(f); British Columbia Supreme Court Rules, R. 13(l)(g);
Manitoba Queen's Bench Rules, R. 28(g); Alberta Supreme Court Rules R. 30(g); New Brunswick
Supreme Court Rules 0. 11, R. l(l)(e)); Saskatchewan Queen's Bench Rules, R. 31(1)(f)). THE
SuPREm CoURT PRACICs 78 (1979) (citing 0. 11, R. l(1)(h) (British rule finding jurisdiction if the
defendant published the defamatory words within the jurisdiction)).
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by reference to where the allegedly defamatory statement was
published or communicated. "' In England, Order 11, which
governs jurisdiction over parties not domiciled in the country,
states, "[S]ervice of a writ [necessary to reach defendants outside]
the jurisdiction is permissible with leave of the Court... if the
action begun by the writ is founded on a tort committed within the
jurisdiction." 3'
Canada's Ontario Rule of Practice 25, applied in the Pindling
case, has a similar provision. Ontario Rule of Practice 25 finds in
personam jurisdiction over a foreign defendant if the defendant
committed the tort in Ontario.'" The Ontario Supreme Court in
the Pindling case applied the reasoning used in Jenner v. Sun
Oil,55 a case involving defamation by radio. '56 The Canadian
High Court in Jenner held that the media defendant committed the
tort in Ontario, where the broadcast was heard.'" The Jenner
court explained the rationale behind its holding in a hypothetical.
A person standing south of the U.S.-Canadian border who utters by
modem sound amplification a defamatory statement heard and
understood north of the border cannot deny the commission of a
tort in Canada.' Using this rationale, the Pindling court held
that Ontario had in personam jurisdiction over NBC."9
The Canadian and English courts, like those in the United
States, may decline tot exercise their jurisdictional powers if the
152. See Jenner v. Sun Oil, O.R. 240 (1952). See also Pindling v. NBC, 49 O.R. (2d) 58.
153. THE SUPREME COURT PRALrICE 78 (1979) (citing Order 11 (1)(h) (R.S.C. 1965)).
154. An Ontario court has jurisdiction over a cause of action in personam if and only if the
defendant is served with a writ of summons or voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court.
Ontario Rules of Practice, R. 4. Ontario Rule of Practice 25 sets the rules for service of a writ of
summons outside of Ontario (or service exjuris). See Ontario Rules of Practice, R.25(I). Therefore,
if a plaintiff can serve process outside of Ontario under Ontario Rule of Practice 25, the Ontario court
will have jurisdiction over the case.
155. O.R. 240 (1952).
156. Jenner, O.R. 240 (1952). In Jenner, owners of a U.S. radio station broadcast an
allegedly defamatory statement in the United States. The broadcast was also heard in Ontario. 1d
at 241-42.
157. Jenner, O.R. at 249-51.
158. Id at 251.
159. Pindling, 49 O.R. (2d) at 66.
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forum is not convenient.1" Factors such as convenience to the
parties and witnesses and the accessibility to evidence may also
play a role in the court's discretionary decision."'
The Canadian and English courts have also taken other
approaches to the inconvenient forum issue. Some of these courts
follow the St. Pierre v. South American Stores (Gath & Chaves)
case"es which held that if continuance of the action would be
oppressive, vexatious, or abusive to the defendant's due process,
and if continuance would cause an injustice to the plaintiff, then
the plaintiff's action should be stayed or set aside.63 Other
Canadian and English courts have followed the approach from
MacShannon v. Rockwear Glass.64 A court applying this test
would first analyze whether another jurisdiction exists that would
serve justice more conveniently. Next, the court would decide
whether a stay would deprive the plaintiff of a legitimate or
personal juridical advantage.s
Ontario courts have combined these two tests.'" In the
Pindling case, the counsel for NBC argued forum non
conveniens, and requested a stay of the proceedings in Canada.
Defense counsel maintained that the plaintiff had brought the action
in Canada not becaus6 of its substantial connections, but merely
because it served the plaintiff's own ends.' ' NBC's attorneys
further argued that NBC had not done business in Ontario.'" The
160. McLEOD, supra note 151, at 132. The English courts generally do not apply the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. J. MoRRIs, THE CoNFwI.cT op LAws 97-98 (3rd ed. 1984).
161. 4 C.E.D. title 28, part IV, § 39,-at 28-89 (Ont. 3rd) (July 1990). McLEoD, supra note
151, at 133. Other considerations include the effect of the proceedings on witnesses and the extent
to which foreign law is applicable. Id.
162. 1 All E.R. 408 (1937) (Scott, LJ.).
163. let (burden is on defendant to prove both of these conditions).
164. 1 All E.R. 625 (1978).
165. Id. at 812. See Pindling, 49 O.R. (2d) at 65 (citing the following cases as applying this
test: Plibrico (Can.) v. Suncor, 35 O.R. (2d) 781, 27 C.P.C. 5 (H.C.) (Osler J.) (1982); BP Can.
Holdings v. Westnmin Resources, 32 C.P.C. 300 (Ont. H.C.) (Henry J.) (1983)).
166. See Bonaventure Sys. v. Royal Bank, 16 C.P.C. (2d) 32, 41 (Ont. Div. Ct.) (1986)
(citing Pindling v. NBC, 49 O.R. (2d) 58 (1984)); Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Veliotis, 53 O.R. (2d) 371
(1985).
167. Pinding, 49 O.R. (2d) at 61.
168. Id. at 66.
169. Id. at 62.
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Ontario Supreme Court rejected these arguments and refused the
stay. Applying both the St. Pierre' and MacShannon" tests,
the court required the defendant to prove that the Ontario action
would be "oppressive, vexatious or abusive of the process of the
Court." The defendant could prove this abuse by showing 'that
there was another forum where justice could more conveniently be
served and that the stay would not deprive the plaintiff of
legitimate personal or juridical advantage in Ontario." The
Ontario Supreme Court reasoned that although NBC did not
directly broadcast in Ontario, its "affiliates" '1 did broadcast into
Ontario. The court recognized that the plaintiff acquired a juridical
advantage by bringing suit in Canada rather than in the United
States, where the plaintiff would have the substantially greater
burden of proving knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth.74 On these bases, the court dismissed the motion to stay
the proceedings.
In the Pindling opinion, Justice Montgomery quoted from
Justice Wright in Brewer v. Hadley Manufacturing Co.,75
[We should be mindful of the sovereignty and jurisdiction of others and
of the graceful comity and civility which it would be pleasant to see
universal among all called. upon to be Judges. But this seemly and
literally courtly urbanity must take second place to our doing justice in
cases fairly brought before us by the citizens of our land and Province,
and by others. To do this is our surpassing purpose. If this purpose
guides us in exercising our discretion under Rule 25 we shall have no
cause to apprehend hurt feelings nor resentment in other jurisdictions by
those there dedicated to the same noble ends. 7'
By applying the proper choice of law method, perhaps the courts
can balance both justice and comity and civility."
170. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
172. Pinding, 49 O.R. (2d) at 65.
173. NBCs 'affiliates' were all located in the United States: Detroit, Buffalo, Rochester,
Plattsburg, Syracuse, and Erie. Id at 61.
174. Id at 65.
175. 2 O.R. 756 (1969).
176. Pindling, 49 O.R. (2d) at 64 (quoting Brewer, 2 O.R. at 761).
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C. Choice of Law
After establishing jurisdiction, the court must analyze the
choice of law rules to determine which laws will apply. Choice of
law rules vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Due to
often conflicting policies among jurisdictions, choice of law rules
may significantly affect the outcome of a case. For example, a
plaintiff may be tempted to initiate an action in one jurisdiction
because of its favorable substantive laws. However, upon closer
inspection of the forum choice of law rules, the plaintiff may
decide not to initiate the action in that jurisdiction because its rules
mandate the application of another state's or country's laws.
Conversely, choice of law rules may work to the parties' benefits.
A plaintiff may initiate an action in a forum because its choice of
law rules require the application of another state's laws that are
more favorable to the plaintiff. If a plaintiff initiates the action in
a United States court, the defendant may take advantage of the
choice of law rules by removing the case to a court which would
apply another forum's laws that are more advantageous to that
defendant.
1. United States
Although the United States Supreme Court did not examine the
choice of law issue in the Keeton opinion,1" the facts suggest a
thought-provoking analysis of choice of law. If a party publishes
an insignificant number of magazines in one country and neither of
the parties are domiciled in that forum, should the forum court
apply laws of its jurisdiction? If the forum court does apply forum
law, can the plaintiff also recover for the harm incurred in all other
countries? What if the choice of law rules of the country with the
favorable laws require the application of another country's laws?
How can a court ensure that it is preserving the balance between
freedom of speech and right to privacy? The choice of law rules of
the First Restatement Conflict of Laws, the interest analysis
177. Pielemeier, supra note 2, at 381 (citing Keeton, 465 U.S. at 778).
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approach, and the Second Restatement Conflict of Laws attempt to
answer these difficult questions.
(a) First Restatement
Courts following the First Restatement Conflicts of Laws apply
the law of the place of the tort, or "where the last event necessary
to make an actor liable for an alleged tort"'' 8 occurred. The
benefits of the test lie in its apparent simplicity and rigidity. This
rule requires no weighing of factors or balancing of underlying
policies, only a factual determination of where the "last event" of
the alleged tort took place. Unfortunately, this approach is not as
simple as it first appears.
A defamatory statement may harm the plaintiff's reputation in
more than one state. The First Restatement does not dictate which
state's law would apply. Courts in jurisdictions that follow, the
First Restatement have dealt with this problem in different ways.
Some jurisdictions allow a plaintiff to recover damages for the
harm incurred throughout the United States." This approach
permits the plaintiff to pick among the jurisdictions where the
defamatory statement was communicated and choose the
jurisdiction which would apply the most favorable procedural and
substantive laws. The forum court would mechanically apply the
law of the forum to all of the harm incurred from that defamatory
statement nationwide." The forum court would give no
consideration to other state's laws or to the underlying policies.
The First Restatement thus infringes upon other states' interests by
ignoring these considerations in determining which law applies.
Other courts divide the damage among the jurisdictions where
the plaintiff's reputation was harmed.' If a forum court follows
this approach, it will apply each jurisdiction's laws to its respective
178. REsTATEMENT (FIRST) CONFCt op LAWS § 377 (1934).
179. Pielemeier, supra note 2, at 394.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 394 n.83 (citing Hartmann v.Time, Inc., 166, F.2d 127, 133-36 (3rd Cir.), cert.
denied, 334 U.S. 838 (1948); O'Reilly v. Curtis Publishing, 31 F. Supp. 364, 365 (D. Mass. 1940)).
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division of harm.'" Although it ensures the application of each
state's policies with regard to the harm incurred in that state, this
application of the First Restatement creates great confusion. "
For example, how does a court properly "divide" harm? Is harm
based upon the number of publications, on the reputation of the
plaintiff in a particular state, or both?
In addition to these procedural difficulties, the First Restatement
presents difficulties in application. What does the "last event
necessary to make an actor liable" mean in the context of a
defamation case? This term usually refers to the place of the
injury, but even the definition of the "place of injury" remains
vague in the context of multistate defamation. The "place of
injury" could suggest the place where: (1) The defendant
composed or edited the statement; (2) the plaintiff is domiciled; (3)
the plaintiff incurred reputational harm; or (4) the defendant
published or broadcast the statement.'" For example, in the
Pindling case, did the injury occur in: (1) The United States where
NBC broadcast the defamatory statement; (2) the United States and
Canada where the program was received; or (3) the Bahamas, the
domicile of Prime Minister Pindling? Because the First
Restatement does not accommodate these complex issues, courts
have carved public policy exceptions to this rule. These public
policy loopholes permit the forum court to manipulate the law in
its favor. "
(b) Interest Analysis
In response to the weaknesses of the First Restatement, Brainerd
Currie developed a choice of law method which incorporated the
182. Id
183. Pielemeier, supra note 2, at 394. Remmers, Recent Legislative Trends in Defamation
by Radio, 64 HARv. L REv. 727, 733 (1951).
184. See Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. RaV. 959, 971-78 (1953) (listing ten
possibilities for choice of law in multistate defamation actions).
185. See Yelpaala, Restraining the Unruly Horse: The Use of Public Policy in Arbitration,
Interstate and International Conflict of Laws in California, 2 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 379, 401-04 (1989)
(discussing public policy as an "escape valve" for the First Restatement).
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policies of the interested jurisdictions. He explained the problems
under the present system:
IThe apparatus designed for the handling of real problems of conflict of
laws... provides no more than the illusion of a solution for the real
problems. Where the legitimate interest of two states are in genuine
conflict, the system does not reconcile them, nor determine which is
important nor even permit the state in a position to do so to pursue its
own interests. It simply strikes down the one interest or the other,
indiscriminately, arbitrarily, on the basis of fortuitous and irrelevant
circumstances. Ultimately, the survival of such a system can be attributed
only to the fact that few people care very much whether such matters are
handled intelligently or not .... ."
The goal of interest analysis is to distinguish between conflicts
in which more than one jurisdiction has a legitimate interest in the
application of its laws ("true conflicts") and conflicts in which,
upon closer examination, only one jurisdiction has a legitimate
interest in the application of its laws ("false conflicts"). Currie
proposed that the courts quickly dispose of these conflicts in a fair
and efficient manner. In a "true conflict," the forum court may
apply its own laws. In a "false conflict," however, the court
should apply the law of the interested jurisdiction.'" Many
scholars have commented and criticized this choice of law
theory." The facts of the Pindling case provide an illustration of
Currie's interest analysis method.
Assume that New York-based NBC did not know and had no
reason to know that Canadian television received the broadcast;
NBC had no control over the Canadian broadcast of its programs.
Pindling brings an action in a Canadian court for the defamatory
186. Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conficts of Law Method, 25 U. CHI.
L REv. 227, 253-54 (1958).
187. Other possible outcomes exist under Currie's theory in addition to true and false
conflict: Apparent true conflicts and the "unprovided for" case. See People v. One 1953 Ford
Victoria, 48 Cal. 2d 595,311 P.2d 480, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961); Ervin v. Thomas, 264 Or. 454,506
P.2d 494 (1973).
188. See B. CuRaiU, SELECTED EssAYs ON Coucar op LAws (1963); Brilmayer, Interest
Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent 78 MicH. L RLay. 392 (1980); Sedler, Interest Analysis
and Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A Response to the 'New Critics,' 34 MERCER L.
REV. 593 (1983); Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L Ray. 1 (1963).
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statements heard on Canadian television. A court applying interest
analysis would first examine the relevant laws.
Under Canadian law, a public figure plaintiff must prove that
the defendant communicated a defamatory statement about the
plaintiff to a third party. Canadian law presumes that the
defamatory statement is false. The recently-adopted Canadian
Charter grants freedom of speech but only enforces that provision
in a state action. By placing a relatively light burden of proof on
the public figure plaintiff and by limiting the freedom of speech
guarantee to state actions, Canadian defamation law tilts in favor
of the public figure's privacy. Canada's interest in the Pindling
action would be to protect the Bahamian prime minister's right to
privacy in Canada.
New York law, on the other hand, requires the public figure
plaintiff not only to prove that the defendantfalsely communicated
a statement which harmed the plaintiff's reputation, but also to
prove with "clear and convincing clarity" that the defendant
committed this act with "actual malice." These heavy burdens on
the public figure plaintiff reflect a strong policy in the United
States to protect speech and the media. New York would have an
interest in the Pindling action because placing liability on NBC for
statements broadcast in the United States but uncontrollably
received in Canada would infringe upon NBC's right to free speech
in the United States.
In sum, both Canada and New York would have a legitimate
interest in the action. Applying Canadian law, the forum court
would probably hold NBC liable for defamation. The New York
state courts would require Pindling to meet such a heavy burden
that he may not be able to make a prima facie case. Thus, the
application of the two interested jurisdictions' laws result in
conflicting liabilities. In this "true conflicts" situation, the forum
court may apply its own law.
Now, assume that NBC broadcast the program in the United
States with knowledge that the broadcast would penetrate the
Canadian border; NBC had received endorsements for its program
on Canadian television. Pindling brings an action for the
defamatory statement made on Canadian television. Canadian
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interest would once again lie in favor of Pindling's right to privacy
in the Canadian broadcast. The United States, however, would no
longer have a legitimate interest in the cause of action, because
NBC could have freely broadcast in the United States without
reaching Canadian televisions. This "false conflicts" situation
would require the forum court to apply Canadian law.
At first blush, interest analysis appears to be an ideal choice of
law method because it analyzes the legislative policies of all
jurisdictions involved. But how can the forum court know
determinatively the legislative policy of another jurisdiction?
Oftentimes legislatures do not have a single mind; the-legislators
each had different reasons for passing the law. This problem gives
the forum court another escape valve: characterization of other
countries' legislative policies.89  Courts applying the interest
analysis method can manipulate the policies in favor of their
jurisdiction. The First Restatement's inflexibility and interest
analysis' flexibility have, ironically, led to the same problems.
(c) Second Restatement
The Second Restatement provides the guidelines lacking in the
interest analysis and the necessary policy considerations missing
from the First Restatement. The Second Restatement states that the
court should apply the laws of the "the state which, with respect
to [the defamation], has the most significant relationship to the
occurrence and the parties.""' The Second Restatement gives
concrete rules dictating which jurisdiction's laws presumptively
apply to specific situations. The Restatement created these
presumptions because, in most situations, that jurisdiction will have
189. In Keil v. Henderson, 47 Misc. 2d 992,263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1965), aff'd 26 A.D.2d 595,
270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966), for example, both the plaintiff and the defendant were domiciled in
Ontario. Plaintiffs car also was registered in Ontario. 1,4 at 648. While the plaintiff was on a trip
from Ontario to New York, the plaintiff sustained injuries in an auto accident. Id. Since New York
law does not have a guest statute, this situation creates a "'false conflict." IL at 650. However, the
court recharacterized the policy behind the New York law as deterring negligent driving on its roads.
Id. In so doing, the court created a "'true conflict."
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFUCT OF LAWS § 150(1) (1971).
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a significant relationship to the cause of action. In multistate
defamation, for example, the Second Restatement presumes that the
state with the most significant relationship will be the state where
the defamed person was domiciled at the time of the
communication, if the defamatory statement was published in that
state."' However, if another jurisdiction has a more significant
relationship to the action under the Second Restatement, the forum
court will apply that jurisdiction's laws."9 A court determines
which state has the "most significant relationship" by considering
practical and policy factors. In tort cases, the practical factors
include, but are not limited to: "(a) [T]he place where the injury
occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred; (c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation, and place of business of the parties; and (d) the
place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered." 93 If the practical factors do not determine which law
should apply, then the court will consider the policies of interested
jurisdictions. Policy considerations include: Relevant policies of
the forum and other interested jurisdictions; the protection of
justified expectations; and basic policies underlying the particular
field of law." 4
The Second Restatement lacks the rigidity of the First
Restatement- instead of creating a body of rules, it provides an
"approach." Unlike interest analysis, the Second Restatement
begins with a presumptive rule of law. If a weighing of contacts
and policies rebuts the presumption that the defamed person's
domicile is the place with the most significant relationship, then the
Second Restatement takes a similar approach as interest analysis.
The court under both of these approaches looks at the facts, the
191. id. at § 150(2). If the defamed party is a corporation, courts applying the Second
Restatement will presume that the state with the most significant relationship will be the state where
the corporation has its principal place of business at the time of publication, if the matter was
published in that state. Id at § 150(3). When there is a single aggregate communication to a large
number of persons at one time, the plaintiff has only one cause of action from that communication.
Id at § 150, comment c.
192. Id. at § 150, comment b.
193. RESTAEmENT (SECoND) CONFLICT OF LAws § 145(2) (1971).
194. Id at § 6(2).
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 3
laws, and the policy and determines which jurisdiction has the most
significant interest in the action.
The Second Restatement appears to be the best choice of law
method to apply in defamation cases. This "most significant
relationship" approach provides structure without being too
mechanistic. The following describes how application of the
Second Restatement will lead to equitable results when: (1) The
defendant broadcast the statement from within the forum country;
(2) the defendant broadcast the statement from outside the forum
country; and (3) the defendant broadcast the statement through a
third party.
The court would first consider the interest of the place where the
plaintiff was domiciled at the time of the defamation.. If, as in
Pindling, the defendants did not broadcast, and no other contacts
exist, in that jurisdiction, the forum court should decide which
jurisdiction has the "most significant relationship" to the parties
and the occurrence. In making this determination, the court should
consider the following. If the plaintiff is an individual, the court
should decide where the individual has established a reputation. If
the plaintiff is a corporation, the court should consider where the
corporation is doing business and to what degree. If, for example,
the corporation has a subsidiary in a particular country with which
it has only a tenuous relationship, the harm in that country may not
be sufficient to consider the subsidiary a contact. The court should
also determine where the defendant is domiciled. If a group of
these contacts are all in one country, then the forum court should
probably apply that country's laws.
The court must also weigh the interests of the countries
involved. The court should pay deference to the policies of other
jurisdictions. For instance, in the "Spycatcher" case, the
Australian court should have strongly considered the effect that the
case may have had on British security. By taking matters such as
security into consideration, the most sensitive defense secrets of a
country can expect protection in the courts of other countries.""
i95. Atty Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers (No. 2), 1990 A.C. 109, 3 All E.R. 545 (1988),
2 W.L.L 776 (1989).
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If the defendant corporation did not actually broadcast or publish
in a particular jurisdiction, but the defendant knew or should have
known that the defendant's acts alone would cause the broadcast to
reach that jurisdiction, then those acts would constitute a strong
contact in that jurisdiction. For example, in the Pindling case,
NBC's "affiliates" broadcast defamatory statements from border
cities in the United States.1' Television viewers in parts of
Ontario received these broadcasts." As Justice Montgomery
illustrated in his hypothetical, one cannot expect to broadcast at the
border of one country and be immune from the laws of the other
country.'" Therefore, in the Pindling case, in which conventional
televisions received the affiliates' broadcasts, the Canadian court
should consider this contact and apply its own law. Before
determining unequivocally that the law of the forum applies,
however, the court must weigh other factors.
The court should consider the affiliate's location and transmittal
capacity with respect to the border. If the television broadcast is
weak in the forum country, then that country will have fewer
contacts. If the contacts appear to be strong in both countries, the
forum court should turn to the policy factors in section six of the
Restatement. The forum court should also weigh any evidence
tending to prove that the media derived substantial benefit from its
own broadcast in. Canada. For example, if NBC receives a large
number of endorsements from Canadian corporations, then the
forum court should tilt the balance in favor of applying Canadian
law. This substantial benefit would estop NBC from denying that
the broadcasts into Canada were unintentional.
In the Pindling case, the defendants broadcast through its
affiliates into Ontario. The Canadian cable companies furthered the
broadcast to other parts of Canada.6 1 The forum court should
again consider whether the defendant received a substantial benefit
from the cable companies' broadcasts and whether the media
196. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
197. Pindling, 49 O.R. (2d) at 60 (describing means by which NBC programming to reach
parts of Ontario). Id. (NBC's affiliates broadcast programs into Ontario).
198. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
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defendant authorized the broadcast. If the defendant did receive a
substantial benefit or authorized a broadcast into the forum country,
the law of the country from which the statement was broadcast
may not provide protection. Because this substantial benefit would
link the defendant significantly to the forum, the law of the forum
country would probably apply. If the defendant neither acquired
a benefit nor authorized the broadcast, the forum country should
only find jurisdiction over the defendants and apply its own law to
the extent of the harm from its original broadcast.
This analysis suggests the use of the Second Restatement
approach in defamation cases. The Restatement's strength lies in
its structure and its flexibility. Complex defamation actions require
both of these elements in a choice of law rule. The presumption
creates a "fallback provision" not provided in interest analysis. In
the Second Restatement, if more than one jurisdiction has a
significant relationship to the action, the law of the defamed party's
domicile will apply. The practical and policy factors ensure that
a court will not apply the law of the jurisdiction which has very
little interest in the case. These safeguards preserve national
policies by requiring courts to apply the law of the country with a
substantial interest in the cause of action.
2. Choice of Law in England and Canada
In England and Canada, if the defamation occurs in the forum,
the law of the forum will automatically apply2ro When the tort
occurs completely outside the forum, the choice of law rule is
complex and uncertain.0 1 English and Canadian courts have
200. MCLEOD, supra note 151, at 527. Szalatnay-Stacho v. Fink, K.B. 1 (C.A.) (1947),
demonstrates the inadequacies of this mechanical rule. In the Stacho case, even though all of the
parties were foreign citizens, resident and domiciled abroad, because the tort was committed within
the forum, the lexfori applied. See MCLEOD, supra note 151, at 195 (discussing the Stacho case).
NoRnm, CHESHmRE'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 288 (9th ed. 1974).
201. In applying the law to any given case, a court will use the choice of law rules only for
substantive law. McLEOD, supra note 151, at 197 (citing Can. Accept. Corp. v. Matte, 9 D.LR. (2d)
304 (Sask. C.A.) (1957)). The "'substantive law" usually constitutes the determination of the "actual
matter of dispute between the parties". Id at 198. For procedural laws, the court will apply the law
of the forum (lexfori). Id at 197. It is difficult to distinguish between substantive and procedural
laws. Id. (citing Leroux v. Brown, 12 C.B. 801 (1852) and Berkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360
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traditionally applied the lex fori (law of the forum) or lex loci
delicti (law of the place of the wrong) to tort actions.' Judges
and other scholars have criticized these choice of law methods for
several reasons. These rules are mechanical; they do not take into
account the interests of the conflicting jurisdictions. Like the First
Restatement Conflict of Laws in the United States, application of
the lex loci delicti begs the question: "where is the place of the
wrong?" '  As described above, "the place of the wrong" in a
defamation action could mean the place of publication, one of the
parties' domiciles, or the place where the statement was heard or
read. These problems have caused English and Canadian courts to
reject the lex loci delicti as a complete answer to choice of law
questions.'
The Queen's Bench in Phillips v. Eyre' complicated the
choice of law issue. The Phillips court stated that, "[A]s a general
rule in order to found a suit in England for a wrong alleged to be
committed abroad, two conditions must be fulfilled. First, the
wrong must be of such a character that it would have been
actionable if committed in England .... Secondly, the act must
not have been justifiable by the place where it was done."'
English courts have interpreted the Phillips language to mean that
in every action brought in England arising out of a foreign tort, the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant violated both the lex loci
delicti and the law of England.' To illustrate, in the Pindling
action, if Pindling had brought his defamation action in England,
he would need to prove that he has a cause of action for
defamation in that country. In addition, Pindling would need to
P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961), as different approaches to this problem). If the substantive law
conflicts with the lexfori, the foreign law will not be applied. Ma at 197. Furthermore, no foreign
law will apply if it conflicts with the public policy of the forum. Id at 198.
202. See McLEOD, supra note 151, at 527-30. When the tort is committed within the forum,
the courts automatically apply lexfori, regardless of whether the parties involved are resident and
domiciled elsewhere. Id at 527. Therefore, conflicts of law mainly involves situations where the
tort is committed outside of the forum. ida
203. Id at 529.
204. . Id at 530.
205. LR. 6 Q.B. 1 (1870).
206. Id
207. NoRTH, supra note 200, 267-68 (9th ed. 1974).
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prove that NBC violated U.S. law. Only if Pindling meets these
two requirements would the English courts hear his case. Canada
has adopted a.modified version of this rule. Canadian courts have
applied the traditional rule of Machado v. Fontes. According to
Machado, the plaintiff may bring a cause of action in England only
if the defendant "is neither actionable nor punishable by the lex
loci delicti."' Under this approach, Pindling could bring the
action in England only if he could not sustain the action in Canada
or the United States, if indeed these countries were the "places of
the wrong." 9
The English courts have construed the Phillips case as relating
to both jurisdiction and choice of law. The opinion in Boys v.
Chaplin2 ' demonstrates the split of opinion on this topic. Justice
Willes interpreted the word "actionable" in the first sentence as
"'cognizable or triable," relating strictly to jurisdiction."' Lords
Donovan and Guest suggested in their opinions that both arms of
the rule involve jurisdiction only, and that choice of law remained
an open issue."1'
The majority of English courts have accepted the view that
Phillips related to choice of law. These courts differed, however,
on what choice of law rule to apply." ' Lord Pearson contended
that "the substantive law of England plays the dominant role,
determining the cause of action, whereas the law of the place
where the act was committed plays a subordinate role, in that it
may provide a justification for the act and so defeat the cause of
action -but it does not in itself determine the cause of action."21
Thus, English law would apply unless the wrongful act is
justifiable under the law of the place of the wrong. The problem
with this interpretation lies in its inflexible adherence to lex fori.
208. McLEOD, supra note 151, at 555 (quoting Going v. Reid Bros. Motor Sales, 35 O.R.
(2d) 201, 204-05 (1982)).
209. 3 W.,.R. 322 (H.L.) (1969). See Boys v. Chaplin, A.C. 356 (1971).
210. See NORtM, supra note 200, at 275.
211. See id at 276 (quoting Lord Donovan from Boys, A.C. at 383, and Lord Guest from
Boys, A.C. at 381).
212. See id
213. See id at 279 (citing Chaplin v. Boys, A.C. at 398).
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This method encourages forum shopping; the plaintiff will initiate
the action in England if English law is more favorable.
In order to avoid the mechanical problems of lex fori and lex
loci delicti, a majority of the justices in the Boys case suggested
that the court apply a "flexible" approach to determine which law
applies. None of the lords, however, clearly defined the "flexible
approach." They merely criticized their current system as an
encouragement to forum shop. Lords Hodson and Wilberforce
maintained that the court should adopt Dr. Morris' proper law of
the tort approach. Under this theory, as originally formulated, the
court should apply, "the law which, on policy grounds, seems to
have the most significant connection with the chain of acts and
consequences .in the particular situation."" 4 Morris later refined
his theory to apply the law of the jurisdiction with the most
significant and real connection to the facts." 5 Morris' theory was
the harbinger of the American Restatement Second Conflicts of
Laws."t 6 Lords Hodson and Wilberforce in fact suggested the
application of the Second Restatement in their "flexible
approach.""' 7 Other members of the House of Lords rejected this
suggestion; they feared that application of such a rule will create
too much flexibility. Some suggested that the "proper law of the
tort" and the Second Restatement should only apply to special
situations. If the court in future cases accepts this view, then
defamation should qualify as one of these special situations.
Unlike the mechanical lexfori or lex delicti, the proper law of
the tort approach takes into account all possible contacts and the
policies of interested states. The same analysis of Pindling as
applied under the Second Restatement would apply here; if NBC
had knowledge that NBC affiliates were broadcasting the program
on Canadian televisions, that knowledge could count as a Canadian
contact; if only three televisions received the broadcast, Canada's
contacts would be very weak. Although this choice of law method
214. MCLEoD, supra note 151, at 531.
215. Id
216. Id
217. Boys, A.C. at 390-91.
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does not have the guidelines provided under the Second
Restatement, the proper law approach does have the benefit of
flexibility needed to ensure that the court applies the laws of an
interested jurisdiction. If the court applies the laws of an interested
jurisdiction, the court can preserve the delicate balances between
freedom of speech and right to privacy from manipulative forum
shoppers.
Despite the benefits of the proper law approach, this choice of
law method may not survive. Canada has outrightly rejected the
proper law approach in favor of the lex fori"1 In England, a
majority of the Boys court also rejected the proper law of the tort's
application, without providing a better alternative."19 Because of
the "place of the wrong" ambiguity and the differing balances
between freedom of speech and right to privacy, the flexible proper
law of the tort theory would undoubtedly be the most appropriate
choice of law method for multinational defamation cases.
The above discussion illustrates the great complexity in choice
of law. The diverse approaches of interest analysis, the First
Restatement, the Second Restatement, lex loci delicti, and lex fori
show how parties can greatly benefit by the use of one approach
over another. A successful argument in the determination of choice
of law could mean the difference between a losing and a winning
suit. This is especially true in defamation because the substantive
laws and policies among the countries are so diverse. The
flexibility of the Second Restatement in the United States and the
proper law of the tort approach in England suggests that courts
should apply these choice of law methods to multinational
defamation actions. The rules and policies advanced from these
choice of law methods may help to preserve traditional national
policies.
218. Id
219. Boys, A.C. 356.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Advances in communication have caused publishers, editors, and
authors to become more concerned about defamation law in other
countries and their rights in defamation litigation. Each country
balances right to privacy and freedom of expression differently.
The United States Constitution guarantees freedom of speech. U.S.
citizens rely on this guarantee. England and Canada protect the
right to privacy by giving less freedom to the press. Their citizens
rely on this protected right. If "forum shopping" undermines
national rights in any manner, these rights will slowly lose their
meaning. By requiring the country whose laws apply to have a
substantial relationship to the cause of action, the courts will ensure
the preservation of these vital rights and guarantees.
Kimberly Richards
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